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1. Introduction
The importance and difficulty of understanding the interac-
tion of pricing and inventory decisions in uncertain demand
environments is well established and has motivated a vast
literature on stochastic price-inventory problems (see, e.g.,
Tayur et al. 1999 and Chan et al. 2004 for surveys).
The backbone of these operational models is the classical
newsvendor with pricing model, which incorporates price
sensitivity in the classical inventory problem with stochas-
tic demand.
The existing newsvendor with pricing (NVP) litera-
ture is extensive, but has mainly focused on additive and
multiplicative demand models, providing model-specific
approaches and results. Our goal in this paper is to develop
a unified approach and provide general, nonparametric con-
ditions on demand for the NVP problem with lost sales to
be well behaved in several respects.
We model demand as a general stochastic function of
price, which encompasses additive-multiplicative models
typically used in the NVP literature (Petruzzi and Dada
1999) as well as other relevant market-response models
not covered by existing results. The latter notably include
attraction models (e.g., logit or power), which are “among
the most commonly used market share models, in both
empirical studies and theoretical models” (Bernstein and
Federgruen 2004, p. 874).
We propose a new measure, the lost-sales rate (LSR)
elasticity, for a given price and inventory level, which cap-
tures key structural properties of the NVP model under
general, stochastic price-dependent demand. Based on this
measure, we provide “nested” sets of conditions (from nec-
essary and sufficient, to easy-to-verify sufficient ones) for
the NVP objective and policy to satisfy desirable regular-
ity and sensitivity properties under both coordinated and
sequential decision processes.
In a perfectly coordinated environment, where price and
quantity decisions are made simultaneously, we show that
if LSR elasticity exceeds 1/2 (globally, respectively, path-
wise), the joint pricing and newsvendor problem is concave
(jointly, respectively, pathwise), hence easy to solve, and
admits a unique solution. Uniqueness is also guaranteed by
increasing LSR elasticity.
In an uncoordinated setting, we investigate the optimal
responses of marketing and operations divisions to a change
in production and price, respectively. Necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for price and inventory policies to be
monotone are characterized by pathwise lower bounds of
1 on the LSR elasticity, along the corresponding optimal
decision path. A global bound of 1 is equivalent to sub-
modularity of expected profits. Monotonicity of the opti-
mal price (respectively, inventory) policy is also ensured by
LSR elasticity increasing in quantity (respectively, price).
In sum, we find that increasing LSR elasticity is an
important property that guarantees uniqueness of the opti-
mal coordinated NVP solution as well as sensitivity results
for uncoordinated policies. We further argue that this prop-
erty is not very restrictive.
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It is natural to assume that a stochastic demand func-
tion D4p5 is decreasing in p in some stochastic sense. It
turns out that increasing LSR elasticity (with respect to
quantity) is precisely equivalent to D4p5 being stochasti-
cally decreasing in price in the hazard rate order (formally
defined in §5), a stronger order than first-order stochas-
tic dominance. We identify a general class of stochastic
demand models with increasing LSR elasticity and show
that it includes the majority of models studied in the NVP
literature as well as other relevant market-response models,
including attraction models. We further characterize what
general demand properties drive the effect of uncertainty on
optimal prices, extending existing comparisons with estab-
lished riskless benchmarks. Thus, our results unify, gener-
alize, and complement the existing NVP literature.
Literature. The vast literature on coordinated pricing
and inventory decisions has been reviewed by Yano and
Gilbert (2003) and Chan et al. (2004), and specifically
for the newsvendor problem by Petruzzi and Dada (1999).
Some representative NVP works include Karlin and Carr
(1962), Lau and Lau (1988), Mills (1959, 1962), Nevins
(1966), Yao et al. (2006), Young (1978), and Zabel (1970).
These papers, and most of the literature, provide results for
additive, multiplicative, or additive-multiplicative demand
models. An exception is Raz and Porteus (2006), who use
a general demand model (not comparable to ours) speci-
fied up to a finite number of empirically estimated fractiles,
assumed piecewise linear in price.
Our model falls in the class of static NVP decision mod-
els with stochastic demand and lost sales. Both in terms
of model and results, our paper is closest to Zabel (1970),
Young (1978), Petruzzi and Dada (1999), Yao et al. (2006)
and references within (cf. their Tables 1 and 2). Our results
based on LSR elasticity are more general, and not domi-
nated by any of these, as discussed in §5.
Our LSR-elasticity based conditions for the NVP model
extend to richer inventory models, including multiproduct,
flexible manufacturing and revenue management models
(see Kocabiyikoglu et al. 2009), as well as some dynamic
settings (see de Vericourt and Lobo 2009). In that respect,
our work is potentially relevant to (albeit not directly com-
parable with) several streams of NVP literature, including
multiproduct (e.g., Netessine and Rudi 2003), competitive
(e.g., Zhao and Atkins 2008, Bernstein and Federgruen
2005), contracting (e.g., Ha 2001, Wang et al. 2004), and
multiperiod models (e.g., Zabel 1972, Monahan et al. 2004,
Netessine 2006). NVP models, where all demand is served
at the set price and excess demand is backlogged at a price-
independent cost, preclude lost sales as a special case—
hence are not comparable to ours (e.g., Federgruen and
Heching 1999, Agrawal and Seshadri 2000, and Chen and
Simchi-Levi 2003).
Finally, our contributions are similar in spirit to Ziya
et al. (2004) and Lariviere (2006), although the setup and
results are not comparable. These authors discuss and unify
important demand assumptions used for pricing and/or
inventory problems. Their conditions translate desirable
concavity properties of a deterministic revenue function
into failure-rate conditions on the stochastic willingness-
to-pay distribution underlying a deterministic price-demand
function.
Structure. The rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. The model and underlying assumptions are presented
in §2. Sections 3 and 4 translate properties of the optimal
price and inventory policies in uncoordinated (respectively,
coordinated) settings into bounds and monotonicity con-
ditions on LSR elasticity. Conditions for monotone LSR
elasticity are presented in §5, together with specific exam-
ples. The effect of uncertainty on optimal prices, as well as
comparison with established riskless price benchmarks are
studied in §6. Finally, §7 concludes the paper.
2. The Model
This paper considers a profit-maximizing firm seeking to
optimize inventory x and/or price p decisions for a sin-
gle product. These decisions are made either sequentially
or simultaneously before observing an uncertain, price-
dependent demand, D4p51 and excess demand is lost. For
simplicity, we assume a constant unit cost c; all our results
extend without loss of generality to increasing and convex
cost functions c4x5. In a coordinated setting (studied in §4),
the firm jointly determines price and quantity decisions,
4p∗∗1 x∗∗51 which maximize expected profit:
max
p1x
ç4p1x51 where
ç4p1x5= pƐ6min4D4p51 x57− c x0 (1)
The constrained (or truncated) revenue is denoted by
R4p1x5= pƐ6min4D4p51 x570 (2)
In an uncoordinated environment (studied in §3), a sales
and marketing division (or a price-setting firm) sets prices
p∗4x5 by optimizing the objective ç4p1x5 in (1) for a given
inventory x, whereas an operations division (or quantity-
setting firm) sets inventory levels x∗4p5 by optimizing
ç4p1x5 with respect to x1 for a given p0
2.1. Demand Model
The price-dependent stochastic demand is modeled as
D4p5= d4p1Z51 (3)
where d is a deterministic demand function, and Z is a ran-
dom variable with price-independent cdf ê and density ,
capturing demand risk. In empirical estimation, Z can be
random noise, or an independent variable in a (possibly
nonlinear) regression model. Conceptually, it is convenient
to think of Z as a sales driver that is uncertain, or not
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perfectly controlled by the decision maker, or the relevant
division of the firm. Examples include market size, personal
disposable income, product quality, advertising spend, or a
reference price (see, e.g., Hanssens et al. 2001).
The demand function d4p1 z5 is decreasing in price p,
strictly increasing in z1 and twice differentiable in p and z.
Throughout the paper the terms increasing/decreasing, pos-
itive/negative are used in their weak sense. Monotonicity
of d allows us to uniquely define the stocking factor z4p1x5
as the value of the sales driver z for which demand perfectly
matches supply, d4p1 z4p1x55= x. (This is consistent with
the model-specific stocking factor definitions in Petruzzi
and Dada 1999, but their normalized mean-variance inter-
pretation is limited to additive and multiplicative settings.)
The riskless (or pathwise) unconstrained revenue is denoted
r4p1 z5 = pd4p1 z53 we assume r4p1 z5 is strictly concave
in p for any risk realization z. Denoting partial deriva-
tives by corresponding subscripts, this condition amounts
to 2dp4p1 z5+pdpp4p1 z5 < 00
The general demand model (3) encompasses the additive
and multiplicative demand models commonly used in the
NVP literature, as well as additive-multiplicative models
(Young 1978):
D4p5= d4p1Z5= 4p5Z +4p51 (4)
where 4p514p5 are decreasing functions of p. Setting
4p5 ≡ 1 gives the additive model (price influences the
location of the demand distribution), whereas 4p5 ≡ 0
gives the multiplicative model (price influences demand
scale).
Additive-multiplicative models, although easy to esti-
mate, make restrictive implicit assumptions that drive the
nature of NVP results (see, e.g., §6). For example, such
models imply a monotone relationship between price and
demand variability, as measured by variance and coefficient
of variation (see Petruzzi and Dada 1999, p. 187). Empir-
ical observations, however, suggest that these relationships
may not hold, in which case existing parametric approx-
imations for the NVP problem perform poorly (see Raz
and Porteus 2006, p. 1765). Our general demand model
fills this gap by making no a priori assumptions regard-
ing the effect of price on demand variability. Moreover,
model (3) encompasses several practically relevant market-
response models, used in the marketing, economics, and
operations literature, that are not additive-multiplicative,
including attraction models such as logit and power choice
models, further described in §5.2.
2.2. Lost-Sales Rate (LSR) Elasticity
For a given price p and stock x, the lost-sales rate
(LSR) is denoted q4p1x5= 1 − F 4p1x51 where F 4p1x5=
P4D4p5 ¶ x5 is the demand cdf, or probability of no lost
sale. The keystone for our developments is a new elasticity
concept, the price elasticity of the rate of lost sales q, for
a given price p and quantity level x. Specifically, the LSR
elasticity is the percentage change in the rate of lost sales
with respect to the percentage change in price for a given
quantity.
Definition 1. The LSR elasticity for a given price p and
inventory level x is defined as
E4p1x5= −pqp4p1x5
q4p1x5
= pFp4p1x5
1 − F 4p1x5 0 (5)
The LSR elasticity E4p1x5 combines the relative sensi-
tivity of (lost) sales with respect to its underlying factors,
inventory, and price. Our results in this paper characterize
relevant structural properties of the NVP problem in terms
of (necessary and) sufficient conditions on E, suggesting
that this particular elasticity concept captures essential fea-
tures of the NVP setup. A more detailed discussion on the
LSR elasticity is provided in §5.
Throughout the paper, price and quantity are implic-
itly optimized over (positive) compact intervals p ∈ P =
6pL1 pH 71 x ∈ X = 6xL1 xH 71 where pH 1 xH are arbitrary,
possibly infinite, and pL ¾ c0 We set xL = 0 without
loss of generality, and pL = arg max8d4p1ê−141 − c/p553
p ¾ c9; our results hold for any subintervals of P and
X thus defined. The lower bound on price, pL1 helps to
express price monotonicity of the optimal inventory level
in terms of LSR elasticity (in Theorem 1b). This bound is
in a sense necessary, as argued in §3, and not very restric-
tive. For example, for additive models a− bp+ Z1 with Z
uniform on 60117 or exponential with mean 1, we obtain
pL = c whenever b ¾ 1/c1 effectively imposing no addi-
tional restriction on the admissible price range.
A glossary of notation is provided in the appendix.
3. Price-Inventory Interactions in a
Sequential Decision Process
In most practical settings, price and inventory decisions
are not managed simultaneously, but rather sequentially, by
separate units of the firm (Zhao and Atkins 2008); sales
and marketing divisions set prices based on planned inven-
tory, whereas operations (or supply chain planning) divi-
sions decide production or inventory levels based on preset
prices.
Economic considerations suggest that lower prices lead
to higher mean demand, and consequently should drive up
the preferred inventory levels. On the other hand, stochas-
tic inventory theory predicts that lower prices lead to
lower underage costs, and hence lower safety stocks, driv-
ing inventory levels down. These two arguments suggest
that under demand uncertainty the relationship between
price and quantity is generally ambiguous, as previously
acknowledged in the literature (Zabel 1970, Raz and
Porteus 2006). This section presents conditions, in terms
of LSR elasticity, for optimal price and inventory poli-
cies, p∗4x5 and x∗4p5, respectively, to be monotone in such
uncoordinated settings. These policies are obtained by opti-
mizing ç4p1x5 in (1) with respect to p and x, respectively,
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with the other variable as a parameter (see Lemma 1 in the
appendix).
A widely used sufficient condition for comparative stat-
ics is submodularity of the objective function. (A differen-
tiable function 4x1 y5 is submodular if it has a negative
cross derivative xy4x1 y5 ¶ 0 supermodularity is defined
by the opposite inequality.) All proofs are provided in the
appendix.
Proposition 1. ç4p1x5 is submodular if and only if
E4p1x5¾ 1 for all p and x. In this case, the inventory and
pricing policies x∗4p5 and p∗4x5 are decreasing in their
respective arguments.
Characterizing submodularity of the NVP objective can
be useful to obtain structural properties in more complex
(e.g., dynamic or competitive) settings. De Vericourt and
Lobo (2009) use the elasticity bound of 1 to obtain price
monotonicity (and pathwise concavity) in a dynamic model
of nonprofit operations; these authors emphasize the impor-
tance of obtaining stronger sufficient conditions that can
be propagated in a dynamic setting. In general, checking
E4p1x5¾ 1 amounts to bounds on p and/or x0 For example,
for D4p5 = a− bp + Z1Z ∼ Exponential4151 E4p1x5 ¾ 1
as long as p > 1/b.
The uniform lower bound of 1 on E is sufficient, but
not necessary for the optimal policies to be monotone.
Necessary and sufficient conditions are characterized by a
lower bound of 1 on the LSR elasticity along the optimal
decision paths, denoted E∗4p5=E4p1x∗4p55 and E∗4x5=
E4p∗4x51 x5. Alternative sufficient conditions, based on
monotonicity of E4p1x5 in p or x, are potentially easier to
verify because they do not require evaluation of E along
an optimal policy path.
Theroem 1. (a) The optimal pricing policy p∗4x5 is de-
creasing in x if and only if E∗4x5¾ 1 for all x. In particu-
lar, this holds if E4p1x5 is increasing in x0
(b) The optimal inventory policy x∗4p5 is decreasing
in p if and only if E∗4p5¾ 1 for all p. In particular, this
holds if E4p1x5 is increasing in p0
Sufficiency of the increasing LSR elasticity condition
in Theorem 1(b) relies on the lower bound pL on price,
defined in §2.2. Lemma 3 in the appendix indicates that this
bound is actually necessary, i.e., x∗4p5 decreasing implies
p ¾ pL0 Similar lower bounds on price, which ensure that
demand elasticity exceeds 1, have been used, for example,
by Ziya et al. (2004, 2006).
4. Simultaneous Price-Inventory
Optimization
This section focuses on jointly optimized price and quan-
tity decisions, corresponding to a setting where these deci-
sions are centrally managed by the headquarters of the firm
and/or marketing and operations divisions are fully coor-
dinated (Li and Atkins 2005). We present various sets of
alternative conditions for the objective in (1) to have a
unique solution 4p∗∗1 x∗∗5; this problem is referred to as the
newsvendor with pricing (NVP) problem.
Proposition 2. If E4p1x5 ¾ 1/21 then ç4p1x5 is jointly
concave in p and x, and the (NVP) problem has a unique
price-quantity solution.
Note that the deterministic revenue function pmin4d4p1
z4p1x551 x5 is not jointly concave in 4p1x51 even when
r4p1 z5= pd4p1 z5 is concave. Our result suggests that with
sufficient variability in excess demand guaranteed by the
elasticity bound, the extreme effect of the deterministic case
can be smoothed out. A similar effect was observed numer-
ically by Netessine and Rudi (2003) for a multiproduct
newsvendor model. Similar bounds on different elasticity
measures have been used in the literature to ensure regu-
larity, e.g., by Bernstein and Federgruen (2005), Ziya et al.
(2006), and de Vericourt and Lobo (2009).
Theroem 2. The following alternative conditions are suf-
ficient for the (NVP) problem to have a unique optimal
price-quantity solution:
(a) E∗4x5 ¾ 1/2 for all x; in this case, ç∗4x5 =
ç4p∗4x51 x5 is concave in x.
(b) E∗4p5 ¾ 1/2 or all p; in this case, ç∗4p5 =
ç4p1x∗4p55 is concave in p.
(c) E4p1x5 is increasing in x or in p0
This result allows us to solve the NVP problem numer-
ically as a one-dimensional concave optimization prob-
lem and guarantees uniqueness of the optimal solution
4p∗∗1 x∗∗5. We further argue that in some cases, the (global
and pathwise) 1/2 lower bounds are not only sufficient but
also necessary for the corresponding regularity conditions.
Therefore, no weaker constant bound can be expected to
hold for all demand functions. Indeed, the bounds are tight
for additive linear models, widely studied in the literature
(e.g., Mills 1959, Lau and Lau 1988, Ha 2001, Petruzzi and
Dada 1999, Zhao and Atkins 2008).
Remark 1. If d is linear in p, i.e., d4p1 z5= 4z5p+4z51
then (a) E¾ 1/2 is necessary and sufficient for joint con-
cavity of ç4p1x5, and (b) E∗4 · 5 ¾ 1/2 is necessary and
sufficient for concavity of ç∗4 · 5.
Our results in this section fully generalize those of
Zabel (1970), Young (1978), and Yao et al. (2006), all of
which have increasing LSR elasticity, as argued in §5. In
terms of approach, the majority of the NVP literature and
beyond (e.g., Zabel 1970, Young 1978, Wang et al. 2004,
de Vericourt and Lobo 2009) obtains the optimal price-
inventory policy by optimizing the NVP problem along the
optimal price path. Only Whitin (1955), for deterministic
demand, and Yao et al. (2006), use the opposite sequence,
optimizing the pricing problem ç∗4p5 along the optimal
quantity path x∗4p5. Their approaches rely on the additive-
multiplicative setup and specific assumptions on Z (e.g.,
uniform/exponential in Zabel 1970, logconcave densities in
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Table 1. LSR elasticity conditions for the NVP
solution.
Unique 4p∗∗1 x∗∗5 p∗4x5 ↓ x x∗4p5 ↓ p
E4p1x5 ↑ p or x E4p1x5 ↑ x E4p1x5 ↑ p
E4p1x5¾ 1/2 E4p1x5¾ 1 E4p1x5¾ 1
E∗4x5 or E∗4p5¾ 1/2 E∗4x5¾ 14‡5 E∗4p5¾ 14‡5
4‡5These conditions are necessary and sufficient.
Young 1978), whereas our analysis is general, resting on
the general properties of the LSR elasticity.
Table 1 provides a summary of the alternative LSR elas-
ticity conditions presented in §§3 and 4, which guarantee
relevant properties of the NVP objective function and opti-
mal price and inventory policies in coordinated and sequen-
tial environments.1 Together, these results suggest that the
LSR elasticity concept introduced in this paper captures
essential features of the newsvendor setup. In §5 we show
how the conditions provided in Table 1 can be verified in
terms of properties of the riskless demand d and the risk
distribution Z, and characterize a general class of demand
models with increasing LSR elasticity.
5. Monotone LSR Elasticity
This section presents conditions for monotonicity of E4p1x5
in quantity x and price p1 respectively, which are the key
drivers of concavity and sensitivity results obtained in §§3
and 4, as well as examples of relevant demand forms satis-
fying these properties.
5.1. Demand Conditions for Increasing
LSR Elasticity
It is natural to assume that a stochastic demand function
D4p5 is decreasing in p1 in some stochastic sense. It turns
out that E4p1x5 increasing in x is precisely equivalent to
D4p5 being stochastically decreasing in price in the hazard
rate order,2 or equivalently, the demand failure (or hazard)
rate, hD4p1x5= f 4p1x5/q4p1x51 being increasing in price.
Proposition 3. E4p1x5 is increasing in x if and only
if D4p5 is decreasing in p in the hazard rate order. If,
moreover, the riskless price-elasticity P 4p1x5 = 4−pdp
4p1 z4p1x555/4d4p1 z4p1x555 is increasing in p, then
E4p1x5 is also increasing in p0
We next provide a collection of relatively general suffi-
cient conditions separating the riskless demand d and the
distribution Z. By definition, Z is IFR (respectively, IGFR)
if it has increasing failure rate, hZ4z5= 4z5/41 −ê4z551
(respectively, generalized failure rate, gZ4z5= zhZ4z550
Proposition 4. (a) Suppose that Z is IFR. If dp/dz is de-
creasing in z, then E4p1x5 is increasing in x. If, moreover,
pdp/dz is decreasing in p, then E4p1x5 increases in p.
(b) Suppose Z is IGFR. If the riskless cross elasticity
˜PZ4p1 z5 = 4−pdp4p1 z55/4zdz4p1 z55 is increasing in z,
then E4p1x5 is increasing in x. If, moreover, ˜PZ4p1 z5
increases in p, then E4p1x5 increases in p.
The IFR and IGFR assumptions on Z are commonly used
in the NVP literature and impose “very mild restrictions
on the demand distribution” (Wang et al. 2004, p. 37). The
weaker IGFR assumption “captures most common distri-
butions a modeler would choose to employ” (Tayur et al.
1999, p. 241; also Lariviere and Porteus 2001). IFR distri-
butions are those with log-concave survival functions and
include distributions with log-concave density (also known
as PF2); examples include uniform, exponential, normal,
truncated normal, and lognormal distributions (see Barlow
and Proschan 1996, and Bagnoli and Bergstrom 2005). All
IFR distributions are IGFR, but the reverse is not true; for
example, Gamma and Weibull distributions are IFR over
a restricted set of parameters, but IGFR for all. For more
on IFR and IGFR distributions, see Barlow and Proschan
(1996), Lariviere (2006), or Lariviere and Porteus (2001).
We argue that the generic conditions on d and Z in Pro-
position 4 are, relative to each other, as general as possible.
They are “conditionally necessary” for E to be monotone
in x in the following weak sense: for an arbitrary, given
function d4p1 z51 if the corresponding LSR elasticity is
increasing in x, for all IFR distributions Z, then one can
show that dp/dz must be decreasing in z. Conversely, for
an arbitrary, given Z, if E4p1x5 corresponding to d4p1Z5
is increasing in x, for all demand functions d satisfying the
given conditions, then Z must be IFR. Similar results hold
for part (b) of the proposition.
The following simpler (but stronger) sufficient conditions
are derived from Proposition 4(a).
Corollary 1. Suppose that Z is IFR and dzz ¶ 0 and
dpz ¶ 00 Then E4p1x5 is increasing in x. If, moreover,
the riskless price elasticity, P 4p1x5= 4−pdp4p1 z4p1x555/
4d4p1 z4p1x5551 is increasing in p, in particular if dp +
pdpp ¶ 0, then E4p1x5 increases in p0
Diminishing demand sensitivity in response to a sales
driver, dzz ¶ 0, is a common, empirically validated assump-
tion (see, e.g., Hanssens et al. 2001, p. 95). Submodularity
of riskless demand (dpz ¶ 0) implies that a change in the
uncontrollable sales driver has a greater impact on demand
at lower price levels (and vice versa); our results in §6 sug-
gest that dpz ¶ 0 is necessary for the NVP problem to be
well behaved in other important respects. Both conditions
hold for additive-multiplicative models. Finally, the increas-
ing (riskless) price-elasticity property (IPE) is commonly
used in the NVP literature, e.g., by Ziya et al. (2006),
Netessine (2006), and Yao et al. (2006), and holds, for
example, if d is concave in p; in particular, dp +pdpp ¶ 0
implies concavity of the riskless revenue r .
The NVP literature so far has focused almost exclusively
on additive and multiplicative demand models. The next
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result gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the LSR
elasticity to be increasing in x in such models, as well as
sufficient conditions for monotonicity in p.
Corollary 2. Consider the additive-multiplicative model
d4p1 z5= 4p5z+4p51 as in (4).
(a) If E4p1x5 is increasing in x, then Z is IGFR. If
Z is IFR, then E4p1x5 is increasing in x; if, moreover,
p′4p5 and p′4p5 are decreasing in p1 then E4p1x5 is
also increasing in p.
(b) For multiplicative models (4p5 = 0), E4p1x5 is
increasing in x if and only if Z is IGFR. If, moreover, 4p5
has increasing elasticity, then E4p1x5 is also increasing
in p.
(c) For additive models (4p5= 1), E4p1x5 is increas-
ing in x if and only if Z is IFR. If, moreover, p′4p5 is
decreasing in p1 then E4p1x5 is also increasing in p.
This corollary encompasses most existing NVP results.
Yao et al. (2006) obtain uniqueness of the optimal coordi-
nated solution for general multiplicative (respectively, addi-
tive) models assuming that Z is IGFR (respectively, IFR)
and price elasticity of 4p5 (respectively, 4p5) is increas-
ing. Under these assumptions, Corollary 2 ensures that
E4p1x5 is monotone in both p and x. Their setup already
encompasses most of the existing models in the literature,
as summarized in their Tables 1 and 2. Additive models
usually assume a linear price dependence and IFR (in par-
ticular uniform) risk (e.g., Mills 1959, Lau and Lau 1988,
Ha 2001, Zhao and Atkins 2008). Multiplicative models
are either isoelastic with IGFR risk (Wang et al. 2004,
Monahan et al. 2004), or general with exponential or uni-
form risk, hence IFR (Zabel 1970). All of these, as well
as the additive-multiplicative model of Young (1978, with
logconcave or lognormal risk) satisfy monotone LSR elas-
ticity, in light of Corollary 2. Petruzzi and Dada (1999)
study additive linear and multiplicative isoelastic demand
models. Our results show that IGFR of Z ensures regular-
ity in both models. However, they assume that Z satisfies
2h2Z +h′Z ¾ 01 which holds for all IFR distributions but is
not comparable to IGFR (see Ziya et al. 2004, Conditions 1
and 3). Therefore, Petruzzi and Dada’s (1999) regularity
conditions are generally not comparable to our monotone
LSR elasticity conditions.
5.2. Examples of Demand Models with
Monotone LSR Elasticity
For illustration purposes, we consider some relevant
demand models and characterize conditions on Z for these
to have increasing LSR elasticity. We find that increasing
LSR elasticity is usually equivalent to IFR or IGFR of Z0
Attraction models, such as the logit a4ez−bp5/41 + ez−bp5
and power a4z/4z+pb55 models (e.g., Phillips 2005,
Agrawal and Ferguson 2007), are among the most com-
monly used market share models, both in empirical studies
and theoretical models, and emerge naturally from intuitive
axioms (Bernstein and Federgruen 2004, pp. 873–874).
These models assume a fixed market size, a, from which
the firm acquires a market share that is proportional to
(an attraction value given by) a function of its price (b mea-
sures price sensitivity), and possibly other sales drivers,
captured by z (Hanssens et al. 2001). These models are not
amenable to additive-multiplicative forms, so, albeit widely
used in both theory and practice, they are not covered by
previous NVP results.
A ubiquitous model in the economic and operations
literature is the heterogeneous willingness-to-pay model,
d4p1 z5 = zP4W ¾ p5 (see, e.g., Phillips 2005), where W
denotes consumers’ willingness-to-pay distribution, and z
is the market size. Unlike attraction models, where mar-
ket size is fixed, this model assumes that demand uncer-
tainty comes from market size (a common assumption, e.g.,
for learning models), leading to a multiplicative demand
model. IGFR of the willingness-to-pay distribution is a
common assumption in the literature, ensuring regularity
of the deterministic objective when market size is known
(e.g., Lariviere 2006, Ziya et al. 2004).
Finally, Table 2 also presents conditions for additive lin-
ear and multiplicative isoelastic models, commonly used in
the NVP literature (Petruzzi and Dada 1999), as well as
exponential and log demand models (see Hanssens et al.
2001). The exponential model, d4p1 z5 = ez−bp1 can be
transformed into a multiplicative model by a change of
variables v = ez3 the IFR condition on Z is equivalent to
IGFR of eZ0 The log-model is not amenable to additive-
multiplicative form.
6. The Effect of Uncertainty and
Riskless Benchmarks
We conclude by addressing one of the issues commonly
discussed in the NVP literature: the relationship between
the optimal NVP price and a riskless price benchmark (see
Petruzzi and Dada 1999). We also characterize the effect
of changes in uncertainty on optimal prices, under our gen-
eral demand model. Our results suggest that properties of
riskless demand and revenue/profit drive these results and
explain the effect of uncertainty on optimal prices.
Two price benchmarks are commonly used in the
literature:
• The riskless price: p0 = arg max4p− c5Ɛ6D4p57 max-
imizes profit for average demand.
• The base price: pB4z5 = arg maxp4p − c5Ɛ6d4p1
min4Z1 z557 = Ɛ64p1min4Z1 z557 maximizes profit from
expected sales for a given stocking factor z; here 4p1 z5=
4p − c5d4p1 z5 denotes the riskless profit function. These
extend Petruzzi and Dada’s (1999) definitions in our gen-
eral setting.
Define p∗4z5 = arg maxç4p1d4p1 z55 = arg maxƐ6r4p1
min4Z1 z557−cd4p1 z51 the optimal price for a given stock-
ing factor z0
Proposition 5. (a) If dpz ¾ 01 then p∗4z5¶ pB4z5 for all z1
and p∗∗ ¶ p00
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Table 2. Necessary and sufficient conditions on Z for increasing LSR elasticity.
Demand model d4p1 z5 E4p1x5 E4p1x5 ↑ x E4p1x5 ↑ p
additive linear z− bp bphZ IFR IGFR
multiplicative isoelastic ap−bz bgZ IGFR IGFR
power a
z
z+p2b bgZ IGFR IGFR
logit a
ez−bp
1 + ez−bp bphZ IFR IGFR
exponential ez−bp bhZ IFR IFR
log loga4z− bp5 bphZ IFR IGFR†
economic wtp zP4W¾ p5 gW 4p5gZ IGFR IGFR &W IGFR†
†Conditions are only sufficient.
(b) If dpz ¶ 01 then p∗4z5¾ pB4z5 for all z. If, moreover,
pz ¶ 01 or d4p1 z5= 4p5z, then p∗∗ ¾ p00
The relationship between the optimal NVP price and
the riskless price, as identified in the NVP literature, is
mixed; Mills (1959) shows that p∗∗ ¾ p0 for additive mod-
els, whereas Karlin and Carr (1962) find the opposite for
multiplicative models. Petruzzi and Dada (1999) introduce
the base price p∗B4z5 in order to resolve this inconsistency
and show that it is a lower bound on the optimal price
(for additive linear and multiplicative isoelastic models).
Proposition 5(a) indicates that their result extends to gen-
eral demand models as long as dpz ¶ 00 This condition, dis-
cussed in §5, holds for all additive-multiplicative demand
models. Proposition 5(b) further suggests that the base
price in Petruzzi and Dada (1999) is not a robust lower
bound and can become an upper bound if dpz ¾ 0 (e.g., for
d4p1 z5= log4z− bp5).
We recover Petruzzi and Dada’s (1999) result for addi-
tive linear models (pB4z5= p∗4z51p0 ¾ p∗∗) and show that
it extends for all additive models (dpz = 0). We also recover
their result for multiplicative isoelastic models (pB4z5 ¶
p∗4z51p0 ¶ p∗∗) and show that it extends for all multi-
plicative models. It also extends for additive-multiplicative
models with elastic riskless demand (i.e., elasticity of 4p5
exceeding 1), and more generally, whenever pz ¶ 0. (If
dpz ¶ 0 and pz ¾ 01 we can show that pB4z5¶ p01 but the
relation between p0 and p∗∗ remains ambiguous.)
We further investigate the sensitivity of optimal prices
to changes in uncertainty, as captured by first-order dom-
inance and the convex order: ZL F SD Z1 is stochastically
larger than Z and ZV CX Z is more variable than Z.3 Let
p∗i 4z5 = arg maxƐ6r4p1min4Zi1 z557 − cd4p1 z51 i = L1V .
These results enable the comparison with another riskless
benchmark, p04z5 = arg maxpd4p1min41 z55 − cd4p1 z51
the price that maximizes profit when Z is replaced by its
mean = Ɛ6Z70
Proposition 6. Suppose that ZL F SD Z1 and ZV CX Z0
(a) If rpz ¾ 0, then p∗L4z5¾ p∗4z50 If in addition rpzz ¶ 01
then p∗V 4z5¶ p∗4z5¶ p04z50
(b) If rpz ¶ 0, then p∗L4z5¶ p∗4z50 If in addition rpzz ¾ 01
then p∗V 4z5¾ p∗4z5¾ p04z50
We find that higher demand, triggered by a first-
order increase in the sales driver, leads to higher opti-
mal prices if the riskless revenue r is supermodular; the
effect of variability, as captured by the convex order,
also depends on this condition (and a third-order condi-
tion, which always holds for additive-multiplicative models
rpzz = 0). Supermodularity of r means that marginal rev-
enue increases with z, i.e., dz is price inelastic. This holds
whenever dpz ¾ 01 and in particular for all additive mod-
els (rpz = 1). For multiplicative and additive-multiplicative
models, rpz ¾ 0 whenever (riskless) demand is price inelas-
tic (i.e., 4p5 + p′4p5 ¾ 0). In particular, we find that
p∗4z5 ¶ p04z5 for all additive models, and for additive-
multiplicative models with inelastic 4p5, whereas p∗4z5¾
p04z5 if 4p5 is price elastic.
In summary, the results in this section suggest that the
relationship with riskless price benchmarks may not be
driven by the effect of price on variance and coefficient
of variation of demand, as speculated in the literature
(Petruzzi and Dada 1999, pp. 186–187), but primarily by
the properties of (riskless) demand and profit. In partic-
ular, for additive-multiplicative models the results depend
on whether or not the multiplicative demand component is
price elastic.
7. Conclusion
We introduce a new elasticity concept that provides a
framework to study interdependent pricing and inventory
decisions with stochastic demand. Focusing on the single-
product price-setting newsvendor model, our key con-
tribution is to characterize general models of stochastic
price-dependent demand, which guarantee relevant struc-
tural properties of the optimal price and inventory policies.
These include uniqueness and sensitivity properties of the
joint price-inventory solution in a coordinated system, and
of the optimal pricing and quantity policies in a sequential
decision framework. Our approach relies on a new mea-
sure of demand elasticity, the elasticity of the lost-sales
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rate, or LSR elasticity, whose properties—in particular
monotonicity—drive the desired results. We further char-
acterize general classes of demand models with increasing
LSR elasticity. These classes unify, generalize, and com-
plement assumptions commonly made in the NVP litera-
ture, such as additive-multiplicative models and failure-rate
conditions. We expect these results to be useful for model-
ing stochastic, price-dependent demand in other operational
settings.
Appendix. Proofs
For convenience, we provide in Table 3 a summary of nota-
tion frequently used throughout the paper and appendix. We
denote the evaluation of any function  along the optimal
policy path x∗4p5 as ∗4p5 = 4p1x5x=x∗4p5 = 4p1x∗4p551
for example, ç∗4p5 = ç4p1x∗4p550 Similarly, ∗4x5 =
4p1x5p=p∗4x5. The generic argument of ∗ makes the eval-
uation path unambiguous. Denote ∗x4p5 = x4p1x5x=x∗4p5
and ∗x4x5 = x4p1x5p=p∗4x51 the corresponding derivatives
evaluated at the optimal quantity and price, respectively.
In this notation, the derivative always precedes functional
evaluation.
Proof of Proposition 1. Taking the derivative of the
marginal revenue, Rx4p1x5= pq4p1x51 with respect to p,
we obtain
Rxp = q4p1x5+pqp4p1x5= q4p1x541 −E4p1x551 (6)
where the second equality is obtained using (5). It follows
that Rxp ¶ 0 whenever E ¾ 1. Monotonicity of x∗4p5 and
p∗4x5 follows by Topkis’ Theorem (see Topkis 1998, The-
orem 2.8.2). 
Table 3. Summary of notation.
c Unit cost
x Inventory, stock, or order quantity
p Price
pL Lower bound on price, p¾ pL
p∗4x5 Optimal price for a given quantity x
x∗4p5 Optimal quantity for a given price p
p∗∗1 x∗∗ Optimal NVP price and quantity
D4p5= d4p1Z5 Stochastic price-dependent demand
Z Random component of D4p5
d4p1 z5 Deterministic (riskless) demand function
z4p1x5 Stocking factor, d4p1 z4p1x55= x
r4p1x5= pd4p1 z5 Riskless revenue function
R4p1x5 Expected revenue function
ç4p1x5=R4p1x5− cx Expected profit function
4z53 ê4z5= P4Z¶ z5 Density; resp., cdf of Z
f 4p1x53 F 4p1x5= P4D4p5¶ x5 Density; resp., cdf of D4p5
q4p1x5= 1 − F 4p1x5 Lost-sales rate; survival function of D4p5
E4p1x5 Elasticity of the lost-sales rate q4p1x5
hD4p1x51 gD4p1x5 Hazard (or failure) rate, resp., generalized hazard rate of D4p5
hZ4z51 gZ4z5 Hazard rate, resp., generalized hazard rate of Z
P 4p1x5=
−pdp4p1 z4p1x55
d4p1 z4p1x55
Riskless price elasticity
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on the following lemmas:
Lemma 1. (a) For any given price p, the optimal order
quantity x∗4p5 is unique and solves q4p1x5= c/p0
(b) For any given quantity x1 the optimal price p∗4x5 is
unique and solves∫ x
0
q4p1 v541 −E4p1 v55dv= 00 (7)
Proof. Because the minimum of concave functions is
concave, R4p1x5 = Ɛ6min4r4p1Z51px57 is concave in p
(because r4p1 z5 is concave in p) and in x; this implies
uniqueness of p∗4x5 and x∗4p5. Part (a) states the well-
known critical fractile inventory solution. Equation (7)
states the first-order condition with respect to p. To see
this, write (2) as R4p1x5= p ∫ x0 q4p1 v5dv; hence,
Rp4p1x5=
∫ x
0
4q4p1 v5+pqp4p1 v55dv
=
∫ x
0
q4p1 v541 −E4p1 v55dv1 (8)
where the second equality is obtained using (5). 
Lemma 2. (a) p∗4x5 decreasing in x ⇔ E∗4x5 ¾ 10
(b) x∗4p5 decreasing in p⇔E∗4p5¾ 10
Proof. (a) Optimality of p∗4x5 and the implicit function
theorem imply ¡p∗4x5/¡x= −ç∗xp4x5/ç∗pp4x50 The denom-
inator is negative by the second-order condition. It remains
to show that the numerator is negative. Indeed, (6) and
the assumption of the lemma imply ç∗xp4x5 = q∗4x541 −
E∗4x55¶ 00 Part (b) is analogous. 
Lemma 3. For all p ¾ pL, pLq4pL1 x∗4p55 ¾ c0 Moreover,
E∗4pL5= 1 or pL = c0
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Proof. By definition, pL = arg max8d4p1 °ê−14c/p553
p ¾ c9 = arg max8d4p1 z∗4p553p ¾ c9 = arg max8x∗4p53
p ¾ c90 Hence, x∗4p5 ¶ x∗4pL5 for all p ¾ pL0 It follows
that for all p ¾ pL, q4pL1 x∗4p55 ¾ q4pL1 x∗4pL55 = c/pL0
For the second part, if pL > c, then pL is an interior max-
imizer of x∗4p50 Therefore, by the implicit function theo-
rem, ç∗xp4pL5= 0, which amounts to E∗4pL5= 10 
Proof of Theorem 1. (a) The first part follows by
Lemma 2. It remains to show that E4p1x5 increasing in x
implies E∗4x5¾ 10 Using Lemma 1(b), write
Rp4p1x5=
∫ x
0
Q4p1v5dv1
where Q4p1x5= q4p1x541 −E4p1x550
Because E4p1x5 is increasing in x and q4p1x5¾ 01 it fol-
lows that for any fixed p, Q4p1x5 crosses zero at most
once, and from above. Therefore, if Q∗4x5=Q4p∗4x51 x5 >
01 it follows that for any v ¶ x1 Q4p∗4x51 v5 > 0; hence,∫ x
0 Q4p
∗4x51 v5dv > 01 contradicting the first-order con-
dition, Rp4p1x5 =
∫ x
0 Q4p
∗4x51 v5dv = 00 It follows that
Q∗4x5=Q4p∗4x51 x5¶ 0, that is, E∗4x5¾ 1.
(b) The first part follows by Lemma 2. It remains to
show that E4p1x5 increasing in p implies E∗4p5¾ 10 The
optimality condition for x (Lemma 1a) states that the fol-
lowing expression, evaluated at x∗4p51 equals zero:
pq4p1x5−c=
∫ p
pL
¡
¡v
4vq4v1x5−c5dv+pLq4pL1x5−c
=
∫ p
pL
q4v1x541−E4v1x55dv+4pLq4pL1x5−c50
By the first part of Lemma 3, the second term, evaluated
at x∗4p51 is nonnegative. Therefore, the first term must be
nonpositive at x∗4p51 i.e.,
∫ p
pL
Q4v1x∗4p55dv ¶ 01 where
Q4p1x5= q4p1x541−E4p1x550 Because E4p1x5 increases
in p, and q4p1x5¾ 01 Q4p1x5 crosses zero at most once,
and from above, as p increases. Therefore, Q4p1x∗4p55¶
01 i.e., E∗4p5¾ 10 
Proof of Proposition 2. We show that the Hessian
matrix of ç4p1x5 is negative semidefinite. The second-
order derivatives are
çxx4p1x5=−pf 4p1x51 (9)
çxp4p1x5=q4p1x5+pf 4p1x5dp4p1z51 (10)
çpp4p1x5=Ɛ6rpp4p1Z53ì7−pf 4p1x5d2p4p1z4p1x551 (11)
where ì = ì4p1x5 = 4D4p5 ¶ x5 defines the event of
no lost sales (arguments are omitted for notational con-
venience), and we use the standard notation Ɛ6A3B7 =
Ɛ6A  B7P4B50 Equation (11) is obtained by differentiating
twice with respect to p the objective in (1), written as
ç4p1x5= pxq4p1x5+ Ɛ6r4p1Z53ì7− cx0 (12)
Because çxx ¶ 0 and çpp ¶ 0 (from concavity of r),
it remains to check that the determinant of the Hessian,
ã4p1x51 is positive. Pairing up terms, we obtain
ã4p1x5=çxx4p1x5çpp4p1x5−ç2xp4p1x5 (13)
= −pf 4p1x5Ɛ6rpp4p1Z53ì7− q4p1x5
· 6q4p1x5+ 2pf 4p1x5dp4p1 z4p1x557 (14)
= −pf 4p1x5Ɛ6rpp4p1Z53ì7
+ q4p1x5242E4p1x5− 150 (15)
The last equality follows from an equivalent expression for
LSR elasticity:
E4p1x5= −pf 4p1x5dp4p1 z4p1x55
q4p1x5
1 (16)
because Fp4p1x5 = ¡/¡pP4D4p5 ¾ x5 = f 4p1x5 ·
dp4p1 z4p1x550 The first term in (15) is positive by concav-
ity of r , and the second because E¾ 1/2. 
Proof of Theorem 2. By the envelope theorem, we have
¡2
¡x2
ç∗4x5=çxx4p1x5−
ç2xp4p1x5
çpp4p1x5
∣∣∣∣
p=p∗4x5
0
From the second-order condition, ç∗pp4x5 < 00 Using (15),
we write
ã∗4x5=ç∗xx4x5ç∗pp4x5−ç∗xp4x52
= −pf ∗4x5Ɛ6r∗pp3ì∗7− q∗4x5242E∗4x5− 151
which is positive whenever E∗4x5 ¾ 1/2 and rpp ¶ 00 It
follows that ¡2/¡x2ç∗4x5¶ 0 and ç∗4x5 is concave in x.
Part (b) is proved analogously. By Theorem 1, E4p1x5
increasing in p or x guarantees the LSR elasticity bound
required by parts (a) and (b) of the proposition, which set-
tles part (c). 
Proof of Remark 1. The proof follows from rpp = 0 and
the proof of Proposition 2 and Theorem 2. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Because
E4p1x5= p−qp4p1x5
q4p1x5
= −p ¡
¡p
logq4p1x51
we obtain
¡
¡x
E4p1x5
p
= − ¡
¡p
¡
¡x
logq4p1x5
= ¡
¡p
f 4p1x5
q4p1x5
= ¡
¡p
hD4p1x50
Therefore, E increasing in x is equivalent to hD increas-
ing in p. For the second part, letting gD4p1x5= xhD4p1x5
denote the GFR of D4p51 observe that
E4p1x5= −pf 4p1x5dp4p1 z4p1x55
q4p1x5
= gD4p1x5P 4p1x51
where the first equality follows from (16) and the second
by definition of gD and P . 
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The proof of Proposition 4 relies on the following
lemma:
Lemma 4. (a) E4p1x5 is increasing in x if and only if
¶E4p1 z5=E4p1d4p1 z55 is increasing in z.
(b) E4p1x5 is increasing in p if ¶E4p1 z5 is increasing in
both z and p.
Proof. Differentiating ¶E4p1 z4p1x55 = E4p1x5 on both
sides with respect to x (respectively, p) we have Ex4p1x5=¶Ez4p1 z4p1x55zx4p1x5 (respectively, ¶Ez4p1 z4p1x55zp4p1x5
+ ¶Ep4p1 z4p1x55 = Ep4p1x550 The result follows be-
cause zx4p1x5 = 1/4dz4p1 z4p1x555 ¾ 0, and zp4p1x5 =
4−dp4p1 z4p1x555/4dz4p1 z4p1x555¾ 00 
Proof of Proposition 4. (a) Writing ¶E4p1 z5 =
hZ4z54−pdp4p1 z55/4dz4p1 z551 we have
¡ ¶E4p1 z5
¡z
= −ph′Z4z5
dp
dz
−phZ4z5
¡
¡z
dp
dz
0
This and Lemma 4(a) imply E4p1x5 is increasing in x
when hZ4z5 is increasing and dp/dz is decreasing in z. The
second part follows from ¶Ep4p1 z5= hZ4z54¡/¡p54pdp/dz5
via Lemma 4(b) because pdp/dz is decreasing in p.
Part (b) follows because ¶E4p1 z5= gZ4z5˜PZ4p1 z5 and from
Lemma 4 (a) by writing
¡ ¶E4p1 z5
¡z
= pg′Z4z5˜PZ4p1 z5+pgZ4z5
¡˜PZ4p1 z5
¡z
0 
Proof of Corollary 2. We focus on E4p1x5 increas-
ing in x1 which, by Proposition 3, is equivalent to
hD4p1x5 is increasing in p. Throughout the proof we
use the general fact that zp4p1x5 = 4−dp4p1 z4p1x555/
4dz4p1 z4p1x555 ¾ 0. For additive-multiplicative models,
z4p1x5= 4x−4p55/44p551 which allows us to write
hD4p1x5=
hZ4z4p1x55
dz4z4p1x55
= hZ4z4p1x55
4p5
= gZ4z4p1x55
x−4p5 0 (17)
(a) If Z is IFR because zp ¾ 01 and  is decreasing, we
obtain
¡
¡p
hD4p1x5=h′Z4z4p1x55
zp4p1x5
4p5
−hZ4z4p1x55
′4p5
24p5
¾00
On the other hand, because zp ¾ 0 and  is decreasing, if
¡
¡p
hD4p1x5=
¡
¡p
gZ4z4p1x55
x−4p5
= g′Z4z4p1x55
zp4p1x5
x−4p5
+ gZ4z4p1x55
′4p5
4x−4p552 ¾ 01
then gZ must be increasing, i.e., Z is IGFR.
(b) For the multiplicative case, 4p5= 01 so
hD4p1x5=
1
4p5
hZ
(
x
4p5
)
= 1
x
gZ4z4p1x550
Again, because zp ¾ 0, we have that hD is increasing in p
if and only if gZ is increasing, i.e., Z is IGFR.
(c) For the additive case, 4p5 = 11 so ¡/¡p ·
4hD4p1x55 = h′Z4z4p1x55zp4p1x50 Because zp ¾ 01 hD is
increasing in p if and only if hZ is increasing, i.e., Z is IFR.
The conditions for E4p1x5 increasing in p follow
directly from Corollary 1 for parts (a) and (c), whereas
part (b) follows from Proposition 4(b). 
Proof of the Results in Table 2. For additive-linear
models, z4p1x5 = x + bp, and E4p1x5 = bphZ4bp+ x5 =
bp/4bp+ x5gZ4x+bp50 The first expression shows that this
is increasing in x iff hZ is increasing. The last expres-
sion indicates that gZ increasing implies E increasing in p,
because bp/4bp+ x5 is increasing in p. Setting x = 01 we
see that IGFR is also necessary for E increasing in p.
For the multiplicative isoelastic model, z4p1x5= xpb/a
and E4p1x5= bgZ4xpb/a50 This is increasing in x (respec-
tively, p) if and only if gZ is increasing.
For the power model, z4p1x5 = xpb/4a− x5 and
E4p1x5= bgZ4xpb/a− x50 This is increasing in x (respec-
tively, p) if and only if gZ is increasing (because its argu-
ment is increasing in both x and p).
For the logit model, z4p1x5= bp+ ln x/4a− x51 x¶ a1
and E4p1x5 = bphZ4bp + ln x/4a− x55 = bp4bp + ln x/
4a− x5gZ4x + bp551 where ln = loge 0 The first expres-
sion shows that this is increasing in x iff hZ is increasing,
because the argument of hZ is increasing in x. The sec-
ond indicates that gZ increasing implies E increasing in p,
because the fraction preceding gZ is increasing in p. Set-
ting x = a/21 we see that IGFR is also necessary for E
increasing in p.
For the exponential, z4p1x5 = bp + ln x and E4p1x5 =
bhZ4bp+ ln x50 This is increasing in x (respectively, p) iff
hZ is increasing.
For the base-a log model, z4p1x5 = bp + ax and
E4p1x5= bphZ4bp+ax5= bp/4bp+ ax5gZ4bp+ax50 The
first expression shows that this is increasing in x iff hZ is
increasing. The second indicates that gZ increasing implies
E increasing in p, because the fraction in front of gZ is
increasing in p.
For the economic wtp model, the result follows from
Corollary 2(b); the elasticity of the riskless demand 4p5=
P4W ¾ p5 is precisely the GFR of the willingness-to-pay
distribution W. 
The proof of Proposition 5 relies on the following addi-
tional lemma.
Lemma 5. (a) If pz ¶ 01 the optimal base price pB4z5 is
decreasing in z0
(b) If pz ¾ 01 the optimal base price pB4z5 is increasing
in z0 If, moreover, dpz ¶ 0, then the optimal price p∗4z5 is
increasing in z.
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Proof. For pB4z5, by definition, pB4z5 optimizes ·çB4p1 z5
= 4p− c5Ɛ6d4p1min4Z1 z557= Ɛ64p1min4Z1 z557. There-
fore, ·çBpz4p1 z5 = pz4p1 z5 °ê4z51 and the sign of pz dic-
tates monotonicity of pB4z51 by Topkis’ Theorem.
For p∗4z51 letting ·ç4p1 z5 = ç4p1d4p1 z55 = Ɛ6r4p1
min4Z1 z57− cd4p1 z51 we have
·çpz4p1 z5= rpz4p1 z5 °ê4z5− cdpz4p1 z5
=pz4p1 z5 °ê4z5− cdpz4p1 z5ê4z5¾ 0
when pz ¾ 0 and dpz ¶ 00 Therefore, p∗4z5 is increasing
in z by Topkis’ Theorem. 
Proof of Proposition 5. For part (a), by definition, pB4z5
solves Ɛ6p4p1min4Z1 z557= 01 so
·çp4p1 z5p=pB4z5 = cƐ6dp4pB1min4Z1 z55−dp4pB1 z57¶ 01
because dp4p1 z5 is increasing in z. It follows that p
∗4z5 ¶
pB4z5. For the second part, we write pB45= arg maxp4p−
c5Ɛ6d4p1min4Z1557 = arg maxp4p − c5Ɛ6D4p57 = p01
by abuse of notation. Therefore, for the optimal z∗∗ =
arg max ·ç4p∗4z51 z5, we have
p0 = pB45¾ pB4z∗∗5¾ p∗4z∗∗5= p∗∗1 (18)
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 5(b)
(dpz ¾ 0 implies pz = 4p−c5dpz+dz ¾ 0 because dz ¾ 0),
and the second inequality from the first part of the
proposition.
The proof of part (b) is analogous to (a), yielding the
opposite inequalities than in (18), based on Lemma 5(a),
which relies on submodularity of . The result for
multiplicative demand follows directly from the first-
order conditions. Indeed, p∗4z5 solves  ′4p5Ɛ6min4Z1 z57−
c′4p5Ɛ6z− Z7+ = 00 The left-hand side evaluated at p0 is
positive because  is decreasing, and  ′4p05= 0 (by opti-
mality of p0) so p0 ¶ p∗4z51 in particular p0 ¶ p∗∗0 
Proof of Proposition 6. From Topkis’ Theorem, for
the first part, it is sufficient to show that Ɛ6r4p21
min4ZL1 z55 − r4p11min4ZL1 z557 ¾ Ɛ6r4p21min4Z1 z55 −
r4p11min4Z1 z557 for p2 ¾ p1. If rp is increasing in z,
then for arbitrarily fixed z, u4y5 = r4p21min4y1 z55 −
r4p11min4y1 z55 is increasing in y. Because ZL F SD Z1
it follows that Ɛ6u4ZL57 ¾ Ɛ6u4Z571 which completes the
proof. For the second part, if rp is increasing and concave
in z, then for arbitrarily fixed z, u4y5= r4p21min4y1 z55−
r4p11min4y1 z55 is concave in y. Because ZV CX Z1 it
follows that Ɛ6u4ZV 57¶ Ɛ6u4Z570 Because Z CX 1 these
results enable the comparison of p∗4z5 and p04z50 Part (b)
is proved analogously. 
Endnotes
1. Our results also extend existing cost sensitivity results
(e.g., Ha 2001, Yao et al. 2006). It is well known that
x∗∗4c5 decreases in c, but the optimal price is not neces-
sarily monotone. In fact, p∗∗4c5 is increasing in c if and
only if p∗4x5 increases with x, so in particular if E4p1x5
is increasing in x1 by Theorem 1.
2. By definition, X is smaller than Y in the hazard-rate
order (Y FR X5 if and only if their respective hazard
rates satisfy hX4z5¾ hY4z5 (Müller and Stoyan 2002, The-
orem 1.3.3). The hazard-rate order is theoretically stronger
than first-order dominance and weaker than likelihood-ratio
order; however, the three are actually equivalent for most
parametric families of distributions with the natural param-
eter order (see Müller and Stoyan 2002, Table 1.1).
3. By definition, (1) X first-order dominates Y (X F SD Y)
if Ɛ6u4X57 ¾ Ɛ6u4Y57 for all increasing functions u, or
equivalently, if P4X > t5¾ P4Y > t5 for all t; (2) X dom-
inates Y in the convex order (X CX Y) if Ɛ6u4X57 ¾
Ɛ6u4Y57 for all convex functions u. If X CX Y1 then
Ɛ6X7= Ɛ6Y71 and Var4X5¾Var4Y5 (see Müller and Stoyan
2002).
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